
LESSON 6

WHY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR ARE WARLIKE

I don't want to see us evolve to a point where we have expectations in this country of a war where nobody gets killed on our side and where we don't have any collateral damage on the other side.

--Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA)

The term "Small War" is often a vague name for any one of a great variety of military operations. As applied to the United States, small wars are operations undertaken under executive authority, wherein military force is combined with diplomatic pressure in the internal or external affairs of another state whose government is unstable, inadequate, or unsatisfactory for the preservation of life and of such interests as are determined by the foreign policy of our nation.

--*Small Wars Manual*
United States Marine Corps, 1940

Introduction

Purpose	This lesson shows that OOTW are as dangerous, deadly, and complex as conventional wars and demonstrates why warfighting capabilities are a necessity in OOTW.
Why Study OOTW	The United States clearly faces a number of very different threats to its security, interests, and way of life. The most obvious challenge is the worldwide breakdown of order and the increasing ability of ethnic groups, drug traffickers, street gangs, clans, and other non-state actors to threaten the security of nation states.
Relationship to Other Instruction	The current world situation presents various challenges to professional fighting men and women. These challenges are a consistent theme of this course of instruction.
Study Time	This lesson, including the issues for consideration, will require about 1 hour of study.

Educational Objectives

Dangers of OOTW	Explain why participation in OOTW is just as dangerous and deadly as participation in a conventional war. [JPME Areas 1(e) and 3(a)]
Complexity of OOTW	Evaluate the complexity of OOTW and discuss why thorough training and sound leadership are essential to a favorable outcome for U.S. forces. [JPME Areas 1(a), 1(e), and 3(a)]
Necessity of Warfighting Capabilities	Discuss the realities of the real world and why warfighting capabilities are a necessity in OOTW. [JPME Area 1(e)]
JPME Areas/ Objectives/Hours (accounting data)	1/a/0.2 1/e/0.3 3/a/0.3

Discussion

Concern About Military Casualties

Concern about military casualties is at the center of any public debate over possible U.S. military involvement in any future OOTW scenario. Ever since television footage of body bags helped turn U.S. public support against the Vietnam War, there has been a growing awareness by the nation's leaders that no scenario involving use of the military is risk-free. Consider the following conflicts and casualties:

Date	Conflict	Casualties
1980	Iranian Hostage Rescue Mission	8
1983	Urgent Fury, Granada	19
1983	Lebanon, Peacekeeping	241
1989	Just Cause, Panama	23
1991	Persian Gulf War	383
1992	Restore Hope/ UNOSOM, Somalia	29
1994	Uphold Democracy, Haiti	4

OOTW Spectrum

With exception of the Persian Gulf War, these military operations were conducted in the OOTW spectrum of conflict. Clearly, if history provides any clue to the future, participation in these types of OOTW does not come without the risk of taking casualties. No use of military force or the threat to use force is without risk, even if the operation in which it may be used is categorized as an OOTW.

Post-Cold War World

This, then, is part of the argument as to why OOTW are proving to be extremely warlike. Another factor is the perception that the world situation has changed from the relative predictability of the bi-polar world, where everyone knew which side of the superpower fence they stood on, to the current situation where the fence has been removed and relationships are uncertain. Indeed, the post-Cold War world is an increasingly dangerous place in which governments are losing their monopoly on organized violence and where increasing chaos stems from the illegal activities of non-state actors.

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Discussion, Continued

Commonality	If there is one commonality, it zeros in on the unalterable fact that a wide range of conflict will continue for the long-term and that future warfare will be distinguished by its great diversity. Thus, the need to organize, train, and equip a specialized force for only one type of conflict will not provide the desired results.
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Required Readings

Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Readings wKillebrew, Robert, (Colonel) USA. "Why War Is Still War." *Armed Forces Journal International*, January 1995, Volume I, p. 431. Find this reading in the *Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Readings*, Annex F, pp. F- to F-. Apart from their humanitarian aspect, OOTW are warlike. Success in the warlike aspects of these operations requires us to avoid overly legalistic definitions of war and allow military forces to be used to their natural advantage.

wPeters, Ralph. "The New Warrior Class." *Parameters*, Summer 1994, Volume I, pp. 432-442. Find this reading in the *Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Readings*, Annex F, pp. F- to F-. A new class of what the author terms modern-day warriors is rising up in regions of social turmoil around the world. Having parallels throughout history, these warriors are actually bands of thugs acting outside the bounds of the type of disciplined military we have known in America and Western Europe. After obtaining spoils and status not available to them in peacetime, these warriors prove very difficult to restrain or re-direct.

wOakley, Robert and Bentley, David. "Peace Operations: A comparison of Somalia and Haiti." *Strategic Forum*, Number 30, May 1995, Volume I, pp. 443-446. Find this reading in the *Operations Other Than War (OOTW) Readings*, Annex F, pp. F- to F-. Oakley and Bentley compare peace keeping operations in Somalia and Haiti. Some lessons learned in Somalia have proven to be beneficial in Haiti but operations are difficult to carry out when the UN retains command authority.

For Further Study

Supplemental Readings

The readings listed are **not** required. They are provided as recommended sources of additional information about topics in this lesson that may interest you. They will increase your knowledge and augment your understanding of this lesson.

wJoint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*.

wJoint Pub 3-07, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*.

wJoint Pub 5-0, *Doctrine for Planning Joint Operations*.

wJoint Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations.

Issues For Consideration

Strengths and Weaknesses

What are the strengths and weaknesses of the Marine Corp's warfighting capabilities in OOTW?

Adapting to Various OOTW

Is our service and joint doctrine adequate for OOTW, that is, can we adapt our warfighting skills to the various types of OOTW or do we need to change our doctrine to fit the complexities of the post-Cold War world?

"The New Warrior Class"

According to Ralph Peters, who makes up "the new warrior class"? What changes in doctrine, force structure, and training (if any) will have to be made to meet this new challenge?

Strategic Forum

In the *Strategic Forum* article, how are OOTW in Somalia and Haiti similar and how are they different?
